If your adversary thinks that you're vulnerable to being wiped out in a first strike, he has no reason to fear retaliation. And if he thinks that once attacked you may rationally hold back from retaliation. because at that point it's too late to do any good, he might exploit that rationality and attack you with impunity. Only if you are committed to disprove any suspicion of weakness, to avenge all trespass es
and settle all scores, will your policy of deterrence be credible.
Policy of Deterrence
威懾策略
敵對(duì)方如果認(rèn)為你會(huì)被第一次打擊就干掉，那么他就根本不擔(dān)心報(bào)復(fù)。如果他意識(shí)到你被攻擊后，會(huì)理性思維，認(rèn)為此時(shí)回?fù)魺o(wú)濟(jì)于事，而不予報(bào)復(fù)，他會(huì)毫不留情，濫用你的忍讓?zhuān)ǚ凑龥](méi)有報(bào)復(fù)）。除非你絕不軟弱姑息，毫不猶豫反擊任何過(guò)界行為和所有爭(zhēng)執(zhí)，你的威懾策略才會(huì)奏效。
讀《The Better Angel of Our Nature》，這段話(huà)，我覺(jué)得應(yīng)該是中國(guó)人在和美國(guó)對(duì)抗中采取的一個(gè)策略心理。
2010
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